11:30AM-12:30PM, Wednesday, May 04, 2011
Prof. Himanshu Gupta, Stony Brook University
Title: Dynamic Spectrum Auctions
In cellular networks, a recent trend is to make spectrum access dynamic in the spatial and temporal dimensions, for the sake of efficient utilization of spectrum. In such a model, the spectrum is divided into channels and periodically allocated to competing base stations using an auction-based market mechanism. An efficient auction mechanism is essential to the success of such a dynamic spectrum access model. A key objective in designing an auction mechanism is truthfulness. Combining this objective with an optimization of some social choice function (such as the generated revenue or the social-welfare) is highly-desirable. In this talk, I will discuss design of various polynomial-time auction mechanisms that satisfy a combination of the above objectives: (i) Non-truthful mechanism with near-optimal revenue, (ii) Truthful mechanism with near-optimal social-welfare, and (iii) Truthful mechanism with near-optimal revenue in Bayesian setting. I will also briefly present and discuss performance of our designed mechanisms through simulation results.
Himanshu Gupta is an associate professor in the department of computer science at Stony Brook University, which he joined in 2002. His main research interests are in wireless networking, sensor networks, and design of algorithms. He finished his doctoral in computer science from Stanford University in 1999, and his undergraduate degree from IIT, Bombay in 1992.
For more information about this colloquium, please contact Habib M. Ammari at firstname.lastname@example.org